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ABSTRACT
The ob?ective of this research is to e?amine the adherence to the ???? Blue ?ibbon 
Committee ?B?C? recommendations and its impact on corporate dividends policy 
in ?u?ait. These recommendations are deemed guidelines for improving the 
effectiveness of audit committees of shareholding ?rms. Both descriptive as ?ell as 
analytical methods have been used to test for such effectiveness. ? short ?uestionnaire 
?as distributed to ?? listed ?rms in ?u?ait as ?ell as e?amining published ?nancial 
data of ?u?aiti ?rms ?ith respect to dividend policies during ?????????. ?esults of 
the multiple regressions and sensitivity analysis indicated that there is no signi?cant 
evidence on compliance ?ith B?C guidelines ?hen setting dividend policies by ?u?aiti 
?rms, thus hardly any effect audit committees have on such policies.
Key terms: BRC-1???, Audit Committees, Corporate Governance, Dividends, 
Accounting Policies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate Audit Committees in 
Kuwait
Kuwait is a developing country that has 
a well-organized ?nancial market (KSE? 
with over 202-listed corporations. In 
the following decades, the Government 
of Kuwait issued a number of laws 
to regulate stock-trading activities, 
culminating in August 1?83 with the 
issuance of an Amiri Decree establishing 
Kuwait Stock Exchange. All listed 
corporations were obliged to establish 
audit committees that enable boards 
of directors to gain assurance about 
the ?uality of ?nancial reporting and 
audit processes as well as to approve 
signi?cant accounting policies.
The 1999 Blue Ribbon Committee
The Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC-??? 
was established by the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE? and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD? 
in 1??? to make recommendations for 
improving the effectiveness of corporate 
audit committees (AC?. The primary 
role of the AC is to assume board of 
directors’ responsibility and corporate 
oversight of the ?nancial reporting 
process (Smith Committee, 2003?. Its 
recommendations were guidelines for 
ACs as well as for enforcing corporate 
governance. For BRC-??, AC’s are 
the ultimate monitor of the ?nancial 
reporting process. Likewise, the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and 
?ales (ICAE?, 2001? describes it as the 
cornerstone of the public’s con?dence 
in corporate governance and ?nancial 
reporting.
Both BRC-?? and the Smith Committee 
(2003? made recommendations on the 
functioning of AC in a number of areas 
including the composition, independence, 
size, ?nancial expertise and diligence, 
which are seen as the cornerstone of 
the public’s con?dence in corporate 
governance (Smith Committee, 2003, 
5.1? and (Mangena and Tauringana, 
2008?. Moreover, it enables boards of 
directors to achieve their ?nancial and 
?duciary responsibilities to shareholders 
(Bean, 1???? (Abbot et al, 2004?.
Study Importance
This study is an attempt to explore 
compliance to corporate governance 
guidelines as set forth by BRC ?? and 
subse?uently, examining the relationship 
between ACs effectiveness and the 
payout policy in Kuwait. To this end, it 
is of paramount magnitude to conduct an 
empirical insight into the issue especially 
after the establishment of the Capital 
Market Authority in 2010. This issue is 
also of great signi?cance as the country 
is going under a crucial and long lasting 
development plan. It is paramount to 
examine the effectiveness of Kuwaiti 
corporations ACs in their oversight of 
accounting policies implementation and 
safeguarding shareholders e?uity.
Most current studies often fail to 
?nd statistically signi?cant of ACs 
effectiveness on corporate governance 
and dividends payout policy particularly 
in developing countries. Normally, 
this effectiveness is measured through 
compliance tests such as the adherence 
to professional guidelines or otherwise 
state regulations of the same mandate. 
Signi?cant ?ndings will compel more 
regulation of the auditing profession in 
Kuwait and subse?uently in other GCC 
countries. It will certainly assist decision 
makers at both ministry of commerce 
as well as CMA in determining suitable 
resolutions and regulations of business 
practices while maintain interests 
of investors and shareholders in the 
country. This will eventually re?uire all 
government bodies as well as Kuwait 
Accounting and Auditing Association 
(KAAA? to revise Law No. 5?1?81 
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that regulate auditing profession to 
capture BRC guidelines. Moreover, 
once these regulations are enforced, 
it would be of audit ?rms’ interest 
to intensely comprehend operations 
of many corporations such as Quasi-
public shareholdings, holdings, family 
owned businesses, Special Purpose 
Vehicles (SPV co.?, and Islamic 
corporations in order to ?ualify for 
internal audit professional services 
and deliver meaningfully.  Overall, 
immense effort is necessary to have these 
regulations empowered within a short 
period. Certainly, this will necessitate 
conducting further studies extending 
the present study in order to improve 
the performance of audit committees as 
well as to maintain a competent auditing 
profession in the country.
II. EARLIER STUDIES
Many studies have addressed compliance 
with audit standards in laying accounting 
policies though within the classical 
context of accounting theory (Black, 
1?76? G?mes, 1??6? Fluck, 1??8? Myers 
and Majiuf, 1?84? Grossman and Hart, 
1?80? Jensen, 1?86? and Easterbrook, 
1?84?. Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010? 
have found that ?rms with stronger 
corporate governance have higher 
dividend payouts.
Researches examining the relationship 
between audit committees effectiveness 
and payout policies are rare, as most 
previous studies have inspected the 
effect of different corporate governance 
aspects on payout policies. Chen and 
Steiner (1???? employed a nonlinear 
simultaneous e?uation to examine how 
managerial ownership relates to dividend 
policy and found positive effects, which 
support the agency con?icts between 
external stockholders and managers. 
Similarly, Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006? 
investigated this relationship using a 
sample of 13? listed Italian companies 
and discovered that ?rms make lower 
dividend payouts as the voting rights of 
the largest shareholder increase. Same 
results were supported by Ramli (2010? 
in his study on Malaysian corporations, 
Chen and Dhiensiri (200?? using a sample 
of ?rms listed on New ?ealand Stock 
Exchange (N?SE?, and Baker (2011? on 
Indonesian ?rms. Despite the different 
determinants, all these sample studies 
have revealed some conse?uences on 
dividends policy that at the end affects 
?rm value.
On the governance side, Sawicki (200?? 
traced corporate governance practices in 
?ve East Asian countries? Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand, over the period 1??4 to 2003, 
ending with evidence that dividends act 
as a constructive substitute for other 
corporate governance mechanisms. 
Garc?a and S?nchez (200?? ?ndings, 
however, showed that the variation 
in the results of previous studies on 
CEO duality and AC independence are 
caused by sampling error, while the 
measurement of dependent variables 
and the corporate governance system 
moderate the association between 
earnings management and some 
corporate governance variables.
Most of the prior studies on the 
effectiveness of audit committees in 
governing corporate policies have 
focused on rather generic parameters of 
such effectiveness leading to targeted 
corporate governance. For example, 
Klein (2002? concluded that an effective 
audit committee reduces earnings 
management, Song and ?indram (2004? 
reported lower incidences of adverse 
rulings by the Financial Reporting 
Review Panel (FRRP? for companies 
with effective corporate governance, 
and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005? 
determined that companies with effective 
audit committees are more likely to 
make management forecasts. Likewise, 
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Mangena and Pike (2005? suggested 
greater levels of interim disclosures in 
companies with well-structured ACs. 
?hilst these studies showed ACs’ 
positive effect on ?nancial reporting, 
little is known about how this is achieved 
(Turley and ?aman, 2004?. 
Lawson and ?ang (2011? used the 
mitigation agency of con?icts between 
insiders and investors by reducing 
information asymmetry and concluded 
that negative association between auditor 
monitoring and dividend payouts as it 
appeared robust to several sensitivity 
analyses. This supports the notion 
that investors view stronger auditor 
monitoring as an alternative governance 
mechanism to dividend payouts. Similar 
results could be found Cheung and Chan 
(2004?? Subramaniam and Johnson 
(2006?? Eugene and Imhaff (2003?? 
Kieso et al., (2005?? Bushman and Smith 
(2003?? Mosta?ue et al., (2002?? KPMG 
(2003?? Dah et al., (2011?? Solomon and 
Solomon (2004?? Heuvel et al., (2006?? 
and Pourheydari, (200??.
As for the Arabian environment, very 
few scholars have attempted to test 
this relationship. Using a sample of 3? 
Jordanian industrial companies listed in 
Amman Stock Exchange, Abu Tapanjeh 
(2006? have come up with negative 
results of such effect where only factors 
related to ?nancials and ?rm size were 
signi?cantly correlated with dividends 
policy. Five years later, ?arrad L. et 
al., (2011? repeated the same study with 
focus on ownership structure and ended 
up with results of signi?cant relation 
between foreign ownership structure 
and the dividends payout policy through 
Tobin’s Q as well as return on assets 
(ROA?, Tobin’s Q? is a ratio comparing 
the market value of a company’s stock 
with the value of a company’s - e?uity 
book value. The ratio was developed 
by James Tobin (Tobin 1?6??. It is 
calculated by dividing the market value 
of a company by the replacement value 
of the book e?uity? Tobin’s ? = (E?uity 
Market Value ? Liabilities Book Value?? 
(E?uity Book Value ? Liabilities Book 
Value?,  but low signi?cance as to audit 
committee rulings. Tobin’s Q re?ects 
expectations about future earnings and 
market perceptions. The demand of funds 
by companies for further investments is 
represented by a high Tobin’s .? value, 
which should have a negative impact on 
dividends.
El-Gammel and Showeiry (2012? 
have examined the effect of corporate 
governance represented by board of 
directors and AC on achieving a high 
?uality accounting information in 
Lebanon. Overall, their results revealed 
that the characteristics of board of 
directors and AC could help in achieving 
a high ?uality accounting information.
The most revealing study on this issue 
in the region was of Joshi and ?akil 
(2004?. Even though, the data used in the 
study is now old, but the study examined 
the functioning of ACs in Bahrain from 
the responses of 30 companies listed on 
the Bahrain stock exchange as well as 
from ?uestionnaires to audit ?rms. The 
study primarily focused on the extent to 
which companies in Bahrain have been 
following the standard recommendations 
and guidelines provided by the blue ribbon 
committee BRC-??. Results indicated 
that the establishments of ACs have been 
slow although most of the companies 
have been following largely BRC-?? 
recommendations. However, the concept 
of independent audit committees is yet to 
be popularized in Bahrain as they do not 
report their ?ndings to shareholders, but 
other functions seem to accord with the 
BRC-?? recommendations. However, 
some perceptions of audit ?rms negate 
the claims of the companies to comply 
with BRC-?? recommendations.
In dividend policy decisions, a stock 
price model P0 Dlfks-g shows the 
tendency to increase the price of the 
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stock. However, if cash dividends are 
increased, then less money will be 
available for reinvestment, the expected 
future growth rate will be lowered, and 
this will depress the price of the stock. 
Thus, changing the dividend policy has 
opposing effects. The optimal dividend 
policy for the ?rm is to balance between 
currents dividends and future growth that 
maximizes the price of the stock. Firms 
usually take into account broad categories 
of factors, which effect dividends policy 
such as constraints on dividend payment, 
investment opportunities, availability 
and cost of alternative sources of capital, 
and effects of dividend policy on stock 
price (Mancinelli and Ozkan 2006?. 
The author is not aware of any further 
studies conducted in the Arabian region 
pertinent to this issue.
III. HYPOTHESES
The initial assumption here is that 
ACs have an impact on corporate 
governance in terms of supervising the 
adherence to professional guidelines 
such as those of BRC-??. BRC-?? made 
10 recommendations for improving 
ACs effectiveness as well as 5 broad 
guiding principles for AC to follow in 
devising company-speci?c policies, 
including dividend payout. For this 
independent variable to be tested, some 
proxies were used in a similar fashion 
of previous studies (see for example, 
McHutchison, 2003? Swaicki, 200?. 
In these studies, several dependents 
variables were assumed to have an 
effect on ACs performance such as 
ACs members, organizational structure, 
independence, procedures and resources, 
responsibilities, and ?nancial reporting 
competency 
This study’s independent variable 
is BRC-?? guidelines as related to 
corporate governance, while dividends 
policy, ACs organizational structure? 
independence? membership and 
procedures? responsibilities, and 
?nancial reporting are all dependent 
variables. Accordingly, the following 
hypotheses were developed?
H01: There is a relationship between 
AC organizational structure and ?rm’s 
dividend payout policy.
H02: There is a relationship between AC 
independence and ?rm’s dividend payout 
policy.
H03: There is a relationship between AC 
membership, procedures and resources 
and ?rm’s dividend payout policy.
H04: There is a relationship between 
AC responsibilities and ?rm’s dividend 
payout policy.
H05: There is a relationship between 
?nancial reporting and compliance and 
?rm’s dividend payout policy.
Tobin’s Q ratios are used for testing these 
hypotheses as conducted by previous 
studies (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2006? ?arrad et 
al., 2011?.
Variables and Model 
In order to build up the model used to 
test the aforementioned hypotheses, 
the independent variable BRC-?? 
guidelines is shortened to (Bg?, whereas 
independent Variables are as follow?
Acs = AC structure
Aci = AC independence
Acm = AC membership
Acp = AC procedures
Acr = AC responsibilities
Fri = Financial reporting of period i.
Dyi = Dividends payout in period i.
Correlation among variables would 
suggests effective AC’s role in enforcing 
corporate governance particularly 
when it comes to a sensitive issue 
such as dividends policy. If however, a 
change in dividends payout is reported, 
then supplementary correlation test is 
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conducted. Here, change contains any 
shift in corporate governance elements 
as listed in BRC-?? guidelines.
The General Model
Testing for the variables correlation and 
signi?cance is performed in three steps 
as follows?
3? Multiple Ordinary Least S?uare 
(MOLS? regressions?
1) Measuring dividends policy of a given 
corporate during a given period; 
????? ? ?
????? ?? ????? ?
________________ ( 1 ) 
CD?? ??= Corporate dividends of i 
company during t period, 
NOI?? ?   = Net operating income for i 
company during t period, 
OCF?? ? ?? Net cash flow from operation 
for i company during t period, 
2) Testing for regression analysis ( ? ) for a 
given period; 
???? ?
???? ?
? ?? ?? ???? ?? ?
? ?? ?????? ?? ?????? ???? ??
? ?? ????? ???? ?? ? ? ??? ?
?
?? ? ???
???
??????? ? ??? ????? ?
________________ ( 2 ) 
CD?? ? = Corporate dividends of i 
company during t period, 
???? ?   Fixed denominator equivalent to 
BRC-99 of i company during t period, 
?????? ? ??Change in company i 
earnings during period t, 
?????? ? ? Change in company i 
receivables during period t, 
PPE?? ?? ? company i fixed asset during 
period t,  
A?? ? ? ? ? company i total assets 
during the period t; 
??? ? ?? Random error;
? ? Beta (the regression) 
? ? ??????????????????????? ? ??
DPci,t = ?1Acsk,t +??2Acik,t+?3Acmk,t
+?4Acpk,t +??5Acrk,t
+?6Frk,t +?7Dyk,t +?Tti
+Vi+?i,t
 ________________ ( 3 ) 
Where;
DPci,t = Dividend policy 
changes of company t in period I. 
?1Acsk,t  = ? AC structure, 
company k, in period i. 
?2Acik,t = ? AC independence, 
company k, in period i. 
?3Acmk,t = ? AC membership, 
company k, in period i. 
?4Acpk,t  = ? AC procedures, 
company k, in period i. 
?5Acrk,t  = ? AC responsibilities, 
company k, in period i. 
?6Frk,t  = ? Financial reporting of 
period i, company k, in period i. 
?7Dyk,t  = ? Dividends payout in 
period i, company k, in period i. 
Control Variables: 
?Tti  =  ?k=1, t=2007-2012 Year
Dummy for specific test.
Vi  = Company dividends 
specific coefficient. 
?i,t  = Error factor. 
More explicitly, 
?1Acsk,t is used to test H01: there is 
a relationship between AC 
organizational structure and firm’s 
dividend payout policy; 
?2Acik,t is used to test H02: there is 
a relationship between AC 
independence and firm’s dividend 
payout policy; 
?2Acmk,t &  ?2Acpk,t are used to 
????? ? ? ????? ?? ????? ?
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IV. DATA AND SAMPLE
Data related to the dependent variables 
was collected from published ?nancial 
reports of listed Kuwaiti companies 
during 2007-2012, as well as a 
?uestionnaire survey that was designed 
and distributed to the study sample. 
The sample is randomly selected -10 
companies of the main sectors? Banks, 
?nancial, real estates, industrial, and 
services in addition to 13 companies of 
various selection? Family conglomerate, 
multinationals, gulf based. Selected 
companies must have dividend 
declarations of the least ?ve continuous 
?nancial years at Kuwait Stock Exchange 
(KSE? during 2007-2012. 
Short ?uestionnaires were delivered 
by hand to key personnel at the sample 
companies’ head?uarters and were 
picked up later on. Nine companies did 
not attest to this criterion and reveal full 
cooperation, which were replaced by 
other companies of similar criteria. This 
sort of personally administered approach 
was most appropriate for this research, as 
postal ?uestionnaires are unproductive 
method in Kuwait where people ignore it, 
let alone the inef?ciency of Kuwait post. 
It was a crucial step to establish a key 
person in each company, through friends, 
relatives, and business relationships in 
order to be able to get access, meet, and 
explain the survey to key persons. The 
?uestionnaire was pre-tested by pilot 
study conducted with a random sample 
of ten ?rms to re?ne and clear the ?nal 
?uestionnaire to minimize the risk of 
misunderstanding the ?uestionnaire and 
ensuring its appropriateness.
Answers to the ?uestions were put on a 
likert scale format of ?ve points contained 
in six sections and covering letter. The 
?rst section was general information, 
while the second, third, and fourth 
sections were on the audit committee 
organizational structure? independence? 
procedures and resources respectively as 
deliberated in BRC-??. The ?fth section 
was audit committee responsibilities as 
comprehended by respondents, while the 
sixth section was allotted for ?nancial 
reporting and compliance test.
Similar to all previous studies a 
Crombach Alpha test was employed to 
examine the internal reliability of the 
?uestionnaire, as it is the recommended 
test when ?uestionnaires are designed 
from a set of ?uestions (Lawson and 
?ang  2011?. Table (1? summarizes the 
results of Crombach Alpha test and have 
shown that internal reliability for each 
domain and for all the ?uestions of the 
audit committee effectiveness was higher 
than the reference value which is (0.68? 
(De Vaus, 2002?. Therefore, this data is 
reliable and valid for statistical analysis. 
Further, Several Corporate Governance 
models were found at the sixty three (63? 
sample ?rms.
Descriptive analysis
Collected data was subject to several 
descriptive statistical techni?ues such as 
means and standard deviations. Results 
for each variable of the audit committee 
effectiveness are shown in table (2?.
Most of respondents indicated that 
the organizational structure of their 
AC meet the re?uirements of BRC-
?? and subse?uently ful?ll corporate 
governance. This variable was ranked 
test H03: there is a relationship 
between AC membership, 
procedures and resources and firm’s 
dividend payout policy; 
?2Acrk,t is used to test H04: there is 
a relationship between AC 
responsibilities and firm’s dividend 
payout policy; 
?6Frk,t is used to test H05: there is a 
relationship between financial 
reporting and compliance and firm’s 
dividend payout policy. 
ac
frk
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TABLES
Table (1)
Cronbach Alpha for internal domain of the audit committee effectiveness and reliability 
as per each dependent factor.
DomainNumbers of itemsCronbach Alpha
Organization30.700
Independent80.7?8
Procedure110.876
Responsibility250.?54
Complaisance160.?56
Total630.953
Table (2)
Means and SD for each domain of audit committee’s effectiveness.
DomainMeanSD%Skewness
Organizational structure3.480.736?.60.4
Independency1.881.0?37.61.2
Procedures3.251.2765.00.0
Responsibilities3.330.6466.60.5
Complaisance3.280.7065.60.1
Total3.040.6260.80.2
as the highest by respondents with 
3.48 mean, and 0.73 as a standard 
deviation. All other variables, except 
the independency, were also ranked as 
applicable domains by the majority of 
respondents with (3.33?, (3.28? and (3.25? 
means respectively. Respondents pointed 
out that audit committees accomplished 
their responsibilities and their mandatory 
procedures were in accordance with 
international regulations. However, no 
reference was given to the possibility 
of these committees following BRC-
??, nor con?rmation was provided as 
whether such BRC-?? guidelines are set 
forth in the corporate audit policy. Few 
of the respondents con?rmed their full 
awareness of AC role in setting dividends 
policy, but they signi?ed that ?nancial 
report is reviewed and assessed by the 
AC before it is published. On the other 
hand, most of the respondents provided 
negative indicators toward independency 
of AC members, as this variable was 
ranked as the weakest among AC 
effectiveness domains with a mean of 
1.88 and standard deviation of 1.0?.
V. REGRESSION 
ANALYSIS
The second step of data analysis is to 
explore the effect of AC effectiveness 
on Kuwaiti corporations’ dividends 
policy as measured by two variables, 
TOBIN’S Q and ROA through simple 
linear regressions of the ?ve dependents 
variables. Tables (3? and (4? revealed the 
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results of linear regressions between AC 
effectiveness factors with TOBIN’S Q 
and ROA.
There is no large difference in mean 
values nor noticeable dispersion of the 
?ve dependents variables. Hence, the 
effectiveness of ACs is more linked to 
other variables than those under study, 
which is worth investigating in further 
research. AC ought to be independent 
and have free hand in the auditing 
management adherence to governance 
rulings and corporate policies. Ranked in 
terms of vitality, respondents positioned 
AC scope of work ?rstly followed 
by authority delegated to AC, and 
?nally resources available to AC. The 
organizational structure variable has 
shown the highest results, which supports 
the notion that Kuwaiti companies 
signi?cantly considered the formation 
and structure of ACs.
Although these results hinted no 
signi?cant effect on Tobin’ s Q or ROA, 
yet they contradict with results of both 
Abu Tabanja (2006? and ?arrad et 
al., (2011? but consistent with results 
of Lawson and ?ang (2011? and 
Baker (2011?. Perhaps this is credited 
to dividends payout theories, which 
demonstrate that dividends policies 
cannot be attributed to a single factor. 
It surely relied on many variables such 
companies’ performance, economy 
situations, and manager’s strategies.
Such contradiction and similarity in 
results could be attributed to determined 
variables and to the corporate cultural 
of businesses in every country. Some 
studies has examined the effect of other 
corporate governance parameters on 
dividends payout policy such as board 
of directors and different ownership 
structure whereas the focus in this study 
Table (3)
Simpler linear regression between audits committees’ effectiveness factors and 
dividend policy represented by TOBIN’S Q.
Dividend policy (Tobin’s Q)RR2F ValueSig (f)TSig (t)
Organization0.1410.0201.0?0.3001.040.300
Independent0.0?50.00?0.480.4880.6?0.488
Procedure0.0?10.0080.450.5050.670.505
Responsibility0.0440.0020.100.74?0.3220.74?
Complaisance0.0010.0000.000.??20.00?0.??2
Table (4)
Simple linear regression between audits committees’ effectiveness factors and dividend 
policy represented by ROA.
Dividend policy (Tobin’s Q)rR2F ValueSig (f)TSig (t)
Organization0.2120.0452.540.1171.5?0.117
Independent0.0510.0030.140.70?0.370.70?
Procedure0.15?1.3?0.2430.2431.180.243
Responsibility0.0770.0060.320.5720.560.572
Complaisance0.0350.0010.060.7?70.250.7?7
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on ACs role in enforcing corporate 
governance including setting dividend 
policy. In addition, most of previous 
researches have relied on either published 
data or surveys, whereas this study has 
relied on both methods, which helped in 
conducting comparisons and ensuring 
data validity. 
Albeit respondents have ranked variables 
contributing to effective AC as the 
organizational structure, responsibilities, 
procedures, and ?nally monitoring 
?nancial performance respectively, 
however the average mean for each of 
these four components does not exceed 
(3.48?. AC independency is perceived 
the least effective as it had the lowest 
mean (1.88?. These results are partially 
attributed to the inade?uate awareness 
of ACs role and their impact in decision 
making. In a matter of fact ACs in 
Kuwait are formed as a response to 
Kuwait Stocks Exchange regulations 
and further the Capital Market Authority 
(CMA? enforcements, which forced 
all listed corporations to have ACs to 
monitor companies’ management and 
ensure full enforcement of corporate 
governance. However, results showed 
that performance of these committees is 
moderate due to some hidden restrictions 
on their power as well as to their fragile 
mandate. Moreover, members of these 
ACs are somehow related to the chairman, 
board of directors, and the management 
of corporations, which is seen as normal 
practice since corporate ownership in 
Kuwait is not fully distinguished from 
family owned businesses.
Accordingly, it is clear that Kuwaiti 
corporations concentrate heavily on the 
legal aspects of AC such as structure, 
procedures and instructions but they 
ignore the substance and mandate of 
these committees. AC role is to monitor 
management policies in order to protect 
shareholders’ interest especially small 
investors. Yet, this would never realize as 
long as AC members are not completely 
independents.
The second step of the analysis was 
linear regression, which indicated no 
relationships between any of these 
components and the study’s variables as 
revealed by TOBIN’Q and ROA ratios. 
AC structure has shown the highest 
relationship despite of its insigni?cancy, 
which supported the previous discussion, 
that Kuwaiti corporation’s emphasis on 
legal re?uirements rather than material 
substance of ACs.
Multiple Ordinary Least Square 
Regression – MOLS-
The purpose of this test is to ascertain 
factors associated with dividend policy 
variations are managed away from ACs 
ruling. MOLS test is considered the most 
robust model, since it has the least potential 
to suffer from estimation or measurement 
error. They also measure variations in 
accounting numbers from period to period 
responding to any changes in dividends 
policy (Farook et al., 2012?.  Further 
models of measurement could likewise be 
used on speci?c parameters (i.e., return 
on e?uity and asset spread? which is 
considered to be much more volatile, but 
the analysis here is essentially centered 
on what governs dividend policy. Table 5 
provides Multiple Ordinary Least S?uare 
Regressions (MOLS? of dependent 
variables.
Missing values for each variable were 
excluded pair-wise, thereby maximizing 
the sample size. A total of 315 
observations were available for the tests 
(63 company reports for subse?uent 
5 years?. All tests were proved for 
signi?cant collinearity by reviewing 
both the variance in?ation factor for 
each variable and the hide values. The 
adjusted R-s?uare for the regression 
models range from normal 0.2?3 to 
adjusted 0.250, which was the main 
criterion for selecting it as the key proxy 
measure in hypotheses testing.
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Ho1 predicts that there is a negative 
relationship between AC organizational 
structure and ?rm’s dividend payout 
policy, based on the rule that less 
conformity with BRC-?? in terms of 
AC structure result in less effect. AS 
perceived, p-values of this variable is 
insigni?cant (0.000? at a level of 0.01 
which imply the hypothesis rejection 
on the contrary to previous studies 
Cheung and Chan, 2004? Subramaniam 
and Johnson, 2006? Eugene and Imhaff, 
2003? Kieso et al., 2005? and El-Gammel 
and Showeiry, 2012. This is attributed 
to differences in cultural and business 
environments of each study alongside 
with the general awareness of governing 
corporate policies based on professional 
releases. In addition, the proxy for AC 
structure is likely to be miss-understood 
or ill taken by respondents. Diffusion in 
the existence of or the optimal placing 
of the AC within the organizational 
structure is highly probable particularly 
if we realize that such practice is not 
given proper weight by board of directors 
in the region. 
On the other hand, a positive association 
between AC independence and ?rm’s 
dividend payout policy is observed- 
p-value 0.047 at 0.05 at the 5? 
con?dence level. According Ho2 is 
accepted indicating the importance of 
AC independence for better corporate 
governance, which comes in conformity 
with most of previous studies. The third 
hypothesis (H03? relates the propensity 
of AC membership, procedures and 
resources to corporation’s dividend 
payout policy. Clearly, an increased AC 
involvement in the ?nancial planning 
Table (5)
Multiple Ordinary Least Square Regression Analysis
Dependents Variables Predict Sign ?aria?les ?ariationsCoef. t?Stat p?Value
?1Acsk,t - 0.105 3.?23 0.000***
?2Acik,t - -0.001 ?1.??5 0.047**
?3Acmk,t - 0.004 3.328 0.001***
?4Acpk,t - -0.030 ?2.361 0.01?**
?5Acrk,t - 0.000 ?0.306 0.760
?6Frk,t ? 0.016 2.040 0.043**
?7Dyk,t ? -0.30 ?3.420 0.001***
T 0.000 ?0.605 0.546***
V ?0.001 ?2.1?2 0.030**
Constant 0.485 0.54? 0.584
Observations 315
R-S?uared 0.2?3
Adjusted R-S?uared 0.250
S.E. 0.018
F-Value 6.744
Sig. F (P-Value? 0.000
Missing values are excluded pair wise.
*Signi?cant at a level of 0.10
**Signi?cant at a level of 0.05
***Signi?cant at a level of 0.01
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will lead to a decreased need to perform 
more control on corporate policies. Since 
AC will be able to play a more diversi?ed 
role within the ?nancial system of a 
corporation, few auditing procedures will 
be needed on how to expose the ?nancial 
performance of the corporation. Contrary 
to this prediction, the coef?cient for this 
involvement is signi?cantly positive at 
the 5? level. However, the magnitude 
of the relationship is very small at 
approximately 0.1? ?p-value 0.001?. 
This result could potentially be attributed 
to the speci?cation issues related to the 
dependent variable. In particular, it 
could be argued that ACs local members 
are relatively less competent with the 
developed ?nancial systems where BRC-
?? guidelines were generated. After 
all, the bulk of issues related corporate 
governance was originally generated in 
western economies then exported to the 
rest of the world.
Correspondingly, the fourth hypothesis 
?H04? relates to the propensity of AC 
responsibilities and ?rm’s dividend 
payout policy. Predictions were placed 
on more AC responsibilities and share in 
policy making which would eventually 
resulted in better corporate governance. 
Eventually, responsibilities that are more 
concentrated provide more leeway for 
ACs to perform as elevated. Consistent 
with this prediction, a signi?cant 
negative relationship is found between 
ACs levels of responsibilities and 
dividends policymaking (coef. -0.030., 
and t-stat ?2.361?.
Finally, the ?fth hypothesis (Ho5? 
predicts that the propensity to mitigate a 
relationship between ?nancial reporting 
and corporation’s dividend payout 
policy with AC BRC-??compliance. 
Un?uestionably, pro?t distributions will 
be inversely related to the economic 
growth of a company. Since ACs will be 
under more pressure by board of directors 
to manage pro?ts in recessionary years 
because of greater write-downs of asset 
portfolios. ?et, no signi?cant result is 
found in this respect (Dy coef. -0.30, 
t-stat ?3.420, and p-value 0.001?, despite 
the high signi?cance value of ?nancial 
reporting with AC compliance with BRC-
?? (p-value 0.043 at a 0.5 con?dence 
level?. Once more, this showed that 
ACs have little contribution in deciding 
dividends policies in Kuwait, since 
their role is kept within the veri?cation 
function and that procedures are ful?lled 
as per commercial laws and legislative 
re?uirements.
In summary, some signi?cant results were 
found to support the hypotheses that AC 
has effect on corporate policy-making in 
Kuwait once perform independently and 
according to clear-cut responsibilities. 
However, ACs’ effects on the ?nancial 
planning of these corporations are yet 
to be materialized. This provides some 
support for a number of the literature 
hypotheses when professional conduct is 
involved in ACs scope of work.
Sensitivity analyses
Sensitivity tests were conducted on split 
samples and the raw values for further 
veri?cation among variations (Table 6?. 
The original test considers the absolute 
value of AC variables, since the objective 
of the study is to measure the determinants 
of variation in dividends policy, and 
not necessarily positive and negative 
variations. Hence, the positive and 
negative values might provide differing 
relationships between dividends policy 
and its proposed determinants. The ?rst 
test (positive? considers only the positive 
values culminating a relatively higher 
R-s?uared of 0.426 (original test? 0.2?3?. 
Results remain largely similar, with the 
AC independence variable dropping 
in signi?cance but retaining their 
directional relationship with dividends 
policy governance. 
The second test (negative? considers 
only negative values and yields an 
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R-s?uared of 0.287 as it is the case in 
most of remaining variables, except 
for AC responsibilities. Most of the 
variables dropped in signi?cance, while 
AC independence variable lost complete 
signi?cance. This demonstrates that the 
model has more predictive power for 
positive rather than negative correlations. 
The ?nal test (Raw Values? considered 
raw values for other dependent variables. 
The model has lost the majority of 
signi?cant relationships at all levels of 
con?dence, but these results are likely to 
have resulted from noise generated in the 
calculation of the raw dependent variable.
Literature has to capture the growing 
phenomenon of corporate governance, 
a discretionary ACs conduct that has 
evolved in the last 15 years. Results 
signi?ed that none of the tested variables 
of AC effectiveness showed substantial 
effect on dividends payout policies in 
Kuwait measured by both TOBINS Q 
and ROA. Clearly, dividends payout 
policies in Kuwaiti corporations are 
resolved based on parameters not ?uite 
related to corporate governance nor to 
the AC effectiveness. Enhancing ACs 
independency is surely a core stone 
in improving their role in corporate 
Table (6)
Split Sample Test
Dependents 
Variables
Predict 
Sign
Original 
?alues Positive Negative ?a? ?alues
Coef 
?t??tat? Sig
Coef 
?t??tat? Sig
Coef 
?t??tat? Sig
Coef 
?t??tat? Sig
?1Acsk,t - 0.105(3.?23? ***
0.157
(3.1?5? ***
0.084
(2.175? *
0.01?
(0.508?
?2Acik,t - -0.001(-1.??5? **
-0.001
(-1.425?
0.000
(-0.081?
0.000
(0.275?
?3Acmk,t - 0.004(3.328? ***
0.007
(2.748? ***
0.004
(1.?38? *
0.001
(0.727?
?4Acpk,t ? 0.030(-2.361? **
-0.058
(2.443? **
-0.037
(-1.768? *
-0.008
(0.437?
?5Acrk,t ? 0.000(-.306?
0.000
(0.343?
0.000
(0.03??
0.000
(1.134?
?6Frk,t ? 0.016(2.040? **
0.018
(1.277? ***
0.001
(0.0?0?
0.023
2.121 **
?7Dyk,t ? -.0030(3.420? ***
-0.04?
(-2.7?1? ***
-0.033
(-2.202? **
0.025
(2.037? **
T 0.000(-.605? ***
(1.?14?
-0.002
-0.001
(-0.771? **
-0.001
(-0.822?
V -0.001(-2.1?2? **
-0.002
(-2.830? ***
0.000
(-0.181?
-0.002
(-3.457? **
Constant 0.485(0.54??
2.??4
1.5?3
1.274
(0.757?
0.?54
(076??
Observations 315 75 121 312
R-S?uared 0.2?3 0.426 0.287 0.187
Missing values are excluded pair wise.
*Signi?cant at a level of 0.10
**Signi?cant at a level of 0.05
***Signi?cant at a level of 0.01
Studies in Business and Econom
ics
Vol. 17
No. 1
64
governance. There is a need for a more 
robust organizational setup for these 
ACs, which shall leads to recognized 
ef?ciency and material adherence to 
professional releases. This should not 
undermine other characteristics of ACs 
effectiveness such as size, scope of 
work, structure, and responsibility as 
underlined in BRC-??. By default, this 
would tune-up the ?uality of accounting 
information and the full adherence 
to corporate governance, which will 
eventually, leads to better disclosure by 
Kuwaiti corporations. 
Overall, corporate governance in Kuwait 
is getting momentum in later years 
especially with the raising number 
of scandals related to the doubtful 
transparent ?nancial disclosure. 
Controlling management behavior in 
shareholdings is surely re?uires great 
professional discipline as well as tight 
public enforcement of auditing practices. 
In order to combine these elements into 
a practical formula, one would have to 
come up with miracles. It seems that this 
is an urgent responsibility on part of all 
concerned with auditing and accounting 
in Kuwait. This paper ?ndings point 
out to rather poor in?uence ACs have 
on corporate accounting policies and in 
enforcing corporate governance in global 
form. Beside the alarming indications this 
has on business environment in Kuwait, 
it also trigger reliability ?ueries of 
?nancial statements as the prudentially of 
?nancial decision-making. It its best case, 
respondents have given low signi?cance of 
AC’s in applying BRC guidelines nor any 
other directives that lead to better corporate 
governance. They are attributing the weak 
symptom of corporate governance to the 
supreme power top management implies 
to all including to ACs that are supposed 
to perform independently. It certainly 
initiate the importance of further studies 
of this phenomenon by government 
and professional agencies to secure a 
competent business community. 
VI. CONCLUSION
BRC-?? guidelines and similar 
professional releases provided ACs 
the capability to govern corporations’ 
policies and ensure its consistency with 
international conducts. The evidence 
gathered in this study suggests that ACs 
may potentially contribute in governing 
dividends policies of corporations in 
Kuwait once ACs are truly recognized 
as independent and bestowed complete 
responsibilities as stipulated in 
professional releases. The most signi?cant 
factors associated with ACs effectiveness 
on dividends policy are AC independence, 
responsibilities, and role in the ?nancial 
planning. These results have potential 
implications for regulators in Kuwait 
and the region at large to expedite the 
complete adherence to governing rules 
such as BRC-?? and alike. If decision 
makers are sincere enough to enforce 
corporate governance, then certainly 
active and effective ACs is the preceding 
step in this direction. Such conclusion, 
however, has to be mitigated by the fact 
that results do not indicate causality events 
or conditions of ill regulation. Although 
this study is limited to some variables of 
ACs effectiveness on dividends policy, 
yet the ?ndings gave insight into the 
size of this dilemma in Kuwait, as most 
respondents discounted the role of ACs. 
Indeed, it supports international standard 
of compliance that local corporations 
are obliged to comply with to attain full 
accountability and governance. It adds 
value to local business environment 
and hardens the fragile ?nancial sector 
presently at the country.
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